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Abstract 
After several decades of collaborative arms procurement conducted on juste 
retour principles the Member States of the European Union are moving towards 
market based solutions in their attempts to maintain a competitive and sustainable 
defence technological and industrial base on the continent. This paper seeks to 
conduct a baseline study on the impact of the European Defence Agency’s 2005/6 
Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, the first explicitly market based 
measures enacted. The research design employs mixed methods in the following 
manner: A) a preliminary statistical study into the volume of intra-European trade 
in conventional weapons from 1994-2011, and B) a series of semi-structured 
interviews with policy makers, as well as policy practitioners from both the 
supply and demand side of the defence procurement equation. Results indicate 
that at best the measures have had a small impact on marketization. Although the 
initial results of the preliminary statistical study are decisive, equifinality in 
causation is ultimately difficult to attribute to the Code of Conduct as many 
complex dynamics ultimately affect the trends observed. 
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1 Introduction  
The production and procurement of defence and security materials in Europe is 
largely fragmented and divided into several individual markets. This set-up is 
perpetuated by Article 346 which enables Member States to derogate internal 
market rules when procuring defence and security related products. In the post 
Cold War era this status quo has become ever more unsustainable as the manner 
in which arms are produced globally has undergone significant shifts. Broadly 
speaking, the cost of the most technologically advanced systems continues to rise 
in real terms meaning that the high-value end of the sector is become ever more 
capital intensive.1 Furthermore, on a global scale the industry has undergone a 
process of internationalisation and companies are now feeling the heat of 
competition2. The United States (US) reacted early to these pressures and through 
the efficiency gains of decisive restructuring and consolidation have come close to 
monopolising the global market for international arms sales3.  
 Although aware of these pressures and the threat they pose to their own 
collective defence technological and industrial base (DTIB), European states 
initially reacted slowly and largely pursued collaborative projects to counteract 
the problems of small production runs and duplicated research and development 
costs. This strategy however, did not sufficiently address the issues of duplication 
and over-capacity. Thus recent efforts to promote cross-border trade and mergers 
& acquisitions (M&A’s) have been focused on market based solutions. Here the 
logic employed by the institutions that promote defence procurement 
marketization, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European 
Commission, is that Article 346 has been wildly misinterpreted by Member 
States. In their view, most defence material should fall under Single Market rules 
and Article 346 should be used under special circumstances only and not used as 
blanket sector wide exemption as Member States have persistently done. 
 This paper will focus on assessing the impact of the first such market 
based approach made, namely; the EDA’s Code of Conduct on Defence 
Procurement (CoC). As a soft law instrument, expectations of its ability to 
regulate a market are somewhat low; however, no impact is not equal to low 
impact. Ultimately any progress in a field that is such a closely guarded 
prerogative of Member States can, depending on your predisposition, be seen as a 
success. The overall research question can be summed up as:  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
Economist, The, Defence spending in a time of austerity (2010)   
2
 Camus, Philippe CEO EADS, Hertrich, Rainer CEO EADS, Ranque, Denis Chairman & CEO Thales & Turner 
Mike CEO BAE Systems, The new European Defence Agency: Getting above the Clouds, June 24th 2004 
3
 Jones, Seth G., The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge University Press:2007) p.169 
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Has the EDA’s CoC been successful in promoting the marketization of defence 
procurement in the European Union?  
 
 Measuring success of the CoC in bringing about marketization will be 
conducted by utilizing a multi strategy research design in which the two 
methodological approaches employed seek to answer two distinct yet 
complimentary aspects of the overall research question. 
 
The preliminary quantitative study will treat cross-border trade as a proxy of 
marketization; i.e. if Member States commit to the pledges made in the CoC to 
conduct defence procurement in a cost-competitive manner without prejudice to 
firms based in other Member States then we would expect a rise in the cross-
border trade of defence and security materials. Data from the international arms 
transfers database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
will be utilized to enable a longitudinal study spanning 18 years from 1994-2011. 
This will permit the trend mapping and comparison of the six years since the CoC 
came into effect with the previous six years, as well as the six before it to enable 
the wider contextualization of any trends seen between the immediate pre and post 
CoC eras.  The aim of this part of the study is to confirm whether there has been a 
rise in the intra-EU trade in conventional weapons since 2006, as existing 
literature refers to increasing collaborative projects but has not confirmed what is 
happening to cross-border transfers.   
The second part of the study is comprised of a series of semi structured 
interviews with policy makers and practitioners from both the supply and demand 
side of defence procurement. Here the aim is to gain an insight into how experts 
engaged in defence procurement have actually perceived the CoC and see if they 
can provide more nuanced explanations and motivations for why the measure has 
functioned or failed. More significantly, the CoC is far from the only factor which 
may have played a role in influencing where and how Member States decide to do 
their defence material shopping. Thus this part of the study aims to shed some 
light on whether the CoC can be seen as having a significant impact on European 
defence marketization among other competing explanations for the trends 
observed in the statistical part of this paper.  
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2 Motivation 
Throughout the past 60 years of its existence the European Union (EU) has 
brought ever more economic integration to the continent. Starting as the six 
member European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 the bloc has 
evolved and expanded to become the 27 Member State Single Market, which 
regulates 500 million consumers and discounting internal transactions accounts 
for approximately 20% of all global trade.4 Single Market rules have expanded to 
liberalise markets traditionally close to Member States’ national prerogative such 
as telecommunications and energy supply.5 However, the defence sector in 
Europe has until recently remained largely exempt from any such liberalisation 
and remains largely fragmented in a multitude of nationally protected markets and 
industries. It is estimated that a single European Defence Equipment Market 
(EDEM) could yield cost savings of up to 20 percent once economies of scale and 
comparative advantage have had their impact6. Aside from the burgeoning 
pressure of recession induced austerity the urgency for reform is compounded by 
continuous rises in the cost of defence equipment. Augustine’s law displays the 
exponential rise in the cost of procuring cutting-edge defence equipment as real 
costs more or less double from generation to generation7, while another study 
estimates yearly costs rises of approximately 5-10% per year.8 Ultimately, the 
citizens of Europe are the de facto end consumers of the security that is provided 
by this equipment and should there for have a thorough interest in how to reduce 
costs 
2.1 The case for European capabilities 
2.1.1 Sovereignty, the security dilemma and arms production 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4
 Bomberg, E., Peterson, J. & Stubb, A. The European Union: How Does it Work?( Oxford University Press: 
2008) p.7 
5
 Bache, Ian & George Stephen. Politics in the European Union (Oxford University Press: 2006) p.420 
6
 Hartley, K., Collaboration and European Defence Industrial Policy ,Defence and Peace Economics, 19:4, 303-
315 (2008) p.307 
7
 The Economist, Defence spending in a time of austerity. (August 26
th
 2010) 
8
 Giegerich, B., Budget Crunch: Implications for European Defence, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 52:4 
(2010) p.87 
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That the defence sector in the EU has largely remained exempt from Single 
Market rules comes as little surprise as the production of defence and security 
materials is inextricably linked to the very core notions of state sovereignty9 and 
would thus logically be one of the latter policy areas over which Member States 
would be willing to cede control to Brussels.  
Max Webers work in Politik als Beruf stipulated that one of the unique tenets 
of sovereign states is their monopoly over the use of violence within their 
territory.10 Ideally this monopoly of violence is used to ensure the rule of law 
internally as well as thwart any would be external aggressors who threaten the 
territorial integrity of the state.11 Thus the monopoly of violence exercised 
through police and military forces aims to provide security against existential 
threats both domestic and international.  
In order to make its security credible the state must ensure its forces have 
supremacy over would be adversaries. In the domestic sphere the state can 
regulate its supremacy i.e. police forces may have the exclusive or partially 
exclusive right to bear arms, have the power monitor persons or groups, and can 
arrest and imprison would be threats. The threat from the international sphere 
however provides the state with a somewhat larger headache. Potential 
adversaries are wide ranging, numerous and subject to change over time. In order 
to guarantee its security and indeed survival in this sphere the state aims to insure 
its defensive forces are at least at parity with, if not better than, any plausible 
aggressors. This leaves states with necessity of maintaining a standing army that 
paradoxically leads them to fear one another even more. In his 1795 work Toward 
Perpetual Peace
12
 Emmanuel Kant highlighted this predicament as a justification 
to remove standing armies if real lasting peace was ever to materialise. In 1951 
Herz more broadly defined the existential threat faced by states as the ‘Security 
Dilemma’13 whereby states in an anarchic world system are in a perpetual arms 
race of sorts in which one states’ action to improve its security provokes a 
reaction by others in order to counterbalance, which in turn has knock on effect 
and so on and so forth.14 Of course forms of international cooperation, including 
the EU itself, can mitigate the full effects of the security dilemma, however as 
long as states continue to competitively invest in new arms technologies and 
upgrade their militaries we can assume that the Security Dilemma continues to be 
an occurring phenomenon. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9
Hoeffler, C., European armament co-operation and the renewal of industrial policy motives, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 19:3 (2012) pp.435-451 
10
 Hague, R. & Harrop, M., Comparative Government and Politics 7
th
 ed. (Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke: 
2007) pp.13 
11
 Ibid . p.16 
12
 Kant, Immanuel , Zum ewigen Frieden (Reklam, Stuttgart: 2005) p.5  
13
 Herz, John H., Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities (University of 
Chicago Press, Chigaco: 1951) 
14 Brauch, H. G, From a Security Dilemma Towards a Survival Dilemma Chapter  in Globalization and 
Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century , Hexagon Series on Environmental 
Security and Peace. Vol 3 (2008)  p.540 
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By extension where states procure their defence and security materials is also 
a central tenet of the Security Dilemma. Security of supply is vital to complete an 
overall credible security, which explains why traditionally States owned their 
arms producing industries and to this day major powers typically procure defence 
materials within their national borders. 
2.1.2 Europe’s need for capabilities  
What are Europe’s capabilities needs? The EU is often painted as a civic or soft 
power15 preferring the use of its trade power and access to its Single Market as a 
means to influence around the world. This view of course holds water when 
contrasting the EU with the United States of America (US) with its colossal 
defence budget and its preponderance for the use of military force. However a 
closer look at the EU shows that it too needs investment in new capabilities due to 
operational requirements.  
First and foremost the EU Member States like any other state must guarantee 
the security of its citizens and its continuing existence in the face of the security 
dilemma outlined above. Thus the EU must maintain a credible parity with its big 
regional neighbours such as Russia who has recently been flexing her muscles 
along the EU’s outer borders.16 The 1990’s gave Europe a so called ‘peace 
dividend’ as the Cold War threat had disintegrated yet the US presence on the 
continent remained strong with approximately 100,000 troops continuously 
deployed throughout the decade.17 However this free ride will be coming to an 
end as the US announced a strategic pivot towards the Pacific region. Although 
the full details of this shift are yet to be fully understood, the US Ambassador to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remarked;  
 
“if there ever was a time in which the United States could be counted on to fill 
the gaps that may emerge in European defense that time is rapidly coming to an 
end.”
18 
 
Secondly, Europe needs better capabilities for intervention in its immediate 
neighbourhood. When war broke out in the post-Soviet fragmenting Balkans in 
1992 the Luxembourgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for foreign affairs, 
proclaimed “this is the hour of Europe; it is not the hour of the Americans”19 
Fortunately, at that moment of its utterance no one could comprehend the ridicule 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15
Hix, S., The Political System of the European Union 2
nd
 Ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke: 2005) p.404-
405 
16
 Economist, The  Rethink the Reset: NATO should not give in to Russian aggression (May 19
th
 2012)  
17
 Kane, T. Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003 Center for Data Analysis #04-11 (2004)  
18
 Barry,  J., Historic shift in U.S. Defence Strategy will have a Major Impact on Europe  in European Affairs 
(April 2012)  
19
 New York Times, Conflict in Yugoslavia; Europeans Send High-Level Team (June 29th 1991) 
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this statement would later attain.20 Despite spending collectively $230bn21 on 
defence Europe was not capable of putting an end to the conflict. By 1995 NATO 
initiated Operation Deliberate Force and acted again in 1999 under Operation 
Allied Force. The relative success of these campaigns was however due to US 
participation. In the latter campaign the US provided 95% of all NATO’s 
intelligence needs,22 90% of Air to Air refuelling capabilities23 and delivered 83% 
of all ordnance.24 Only the US was able to deploy all weather strike capabilities 
utilising precision munitions. European strike aircraft were grounded in the early 
stages of the campaign due to the persisting bad weather.25 Considering that 
Brussels is approximately no farther from Belgrade than Madrid, Operation 
Deliberate Force displayed the inability of Europeans to conduct a military 
campaign within their own continent never mind beyond it.26 
The failure of the nineties did not go unheeded and by way of the St. Malo 
Declaration and the commitment to the Helsinki Headline Goal the EU eventually 
developed what is today’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since its 
initial deployment in 2003 the EU has embarked on 8 military operations and 19 
civil security operations outside its borders.27 Furthermore many Member States 
have had active deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. More recently the Arab 
Spring has provided new security challenges to the EU. Several Member States 
intervened to create a no fly zone over Libya and while the Europeans did fare 
better than in the Balkan wars of the 1990’s the operation still had heavy US 
participation in the early stages. After just a few months of operations the EU 
countries were already running low on much need precision munitions that had to 
be hastily purchased at extra cost from the US.28 
Ultimately, forecasting the exact Capabilities needs of the EU and its Member 
States is a difficult task. Does the EU need trans-oceanic force projection 
capabilities? Probably not, but there are some unavoidable certainties; The 
Security Dilemma and the need for better intervention capabilities are both 
problems that will not go away and with the US retreating from Europe’s overall 
security equation the onus is on the EU and its Member States to pick up the 
slack. To meet these needs in the future the EU will need to continue to act 
decisively to make its production and procurement of defence and security 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
20
 Howorth, J., Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke: 2007) 
p.55 
21
 Ibid p.55 
22
 Yost David S. in Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy, Edited by Joylon 
Howorth & John Keeler (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke:2004) p.89 
23
 Ibid 
24 Lambeth, B., NATO’s Air War for Kosovo (Rand, Pittsburgh:2001) p.66 
25
 Yost David S. in Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy, Edited by Joylon 
Howorth & John Keeler (Palgrave Macmillan: 2004) p.88 
26
 One can argue that Europeans could have resolved the conflict using a lower tech approach utilizing mainly 
land forces. However many European nations could not politically commit to the risk of losses involved with 
such an approach. See  Arkin, W., War Over Kosovo Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, edited by Andrew 
Bacevich and Eliot Cohen (Columbia Univ. Press,New York: 2001) 
27
Council of the European Union,  Operations to date (2012)  
28
 Erlanger, S. Libya’s Dark Lesson for NATO (New York Times : September 3
rd
 2011)  
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materials more efficient. What further compounds the problem is that the high-
value high-tech end of defence production: 
 
“is an industry which must operate in a long-term perspective of 20 to 30 years. 
Accordingly, the policy framework which is established today and the resources 
which are allocated now will determine the perspectives and performance of the 
industry for decades to come.”29 
 
Thus it is imperative that the EU acts swiftly so that future security is not 
compromised as a result of present day inaction. 
 
2.2 The case for a European Defence Technological 
& Industrial Base  
Theoretically EU Member States could pack in their defence industries and buy of 
the shelf on the international market. Indeed many Member States that lack the 
industrial capacity to build cutting-edge high-value weapons systems already do 
this. However, there are several motivations both security related and economic 
why this is not a viable long term strategy. 
2.2.1 Maintaining security of supply & operational sovereignty  
The primary motivation behind an indigenous defence industry for any state is the 
security of supply. When shopping for defence materials within its own borders 
the state has a guarantee of supply, as well as unquestionable access to parts, 
maintenance and upgrades regardless of the changes to its diplomatic relations or 
shifts in the international order. By buying off the shelf the state will effectively 
become dependent on the goodwill and continuing alliance with the firm and/or 
government which supplied the goods or service. Should alliances shift and 
relations sour the state faces a real threat of their supply being restricted.  
A prominent example of the precariousness of this policy is provided by the 
Falklands conflict of 1982. The Argentine air force had been supplied with French 
aircraft and state of the art beyond-visual-range fire-and-forget Exocet anti ship 
missiles. These missiles proved deadly to the approaching British Royal Navy 
task force and after some diplomatic work the French Government announced an 
embargo on further arms sales to Argentina and supplied the United Kingdom 
(UK) with technical details of both the missiles and the aircraft.30 If Argentina had 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
29
European Commission, Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century (July 2002) p.38   
30
 BBC, How France helped both sides in the Falklands War (5
th
 March 2012) 
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had unrestricted access to more Exocet missiles the very outcome of the War may 
have been altered. Another prominent example is provided by the EU’s global 
positional satellite programme. The very raison d'etre of the program is to secure 
the supply of an accurate and unhampered positioning signal.31 This was deemed 
necessary as Europe had become wary of US’ tendency to manipulate its Global 
Positioning System (GPS) for its own purposes.32 
Closely linked to the issue of security of supply is the concept of operational 
sovereignty. Here the issue is not about whether further supply is need, but rather 
whether the purchaser has full control and access to the technology that they have 
bought.  
An example of this problem has been fermenting now for some time in the 
multilateral Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Programme. The UK despite being a so 
called ‘Tier 1’ partner in the project and having invested $2billion33 in Research 
and Development (R&D) has still not guaranteed operational sovereignty as the 
US remains reluctant to transfer the source code of the aircrafts complex avionics 
software suite.34  Unsurprisingly the tier two European nations participating in the 
project namely Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, and Norway have no hope in 
acquiring this information should they proceed with purchasing the aircraft.35 
Procuring defence hardware without operational sovereignty comes with 
considerable risks. The UK learnt this the hard way when it procured Chinook 
helicopters from the US in 1995. Despite having been urgently needed in the war 
in Afghanistan they remained sealed in dry storage for over 10 years due to 
Boeings refusal to supply the avionics updates that would make them airworthy in 
adverse conditions.36 
Although procuring from within the EU does not guarantee the security of 
supply nor operational sovereignty it would be from partners that share common 
institutions, a Single Market and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
Furthermore, the chances of asymmetrical procurement relationships as found 
with US in the JSF programme would be less likely as the clout of the partners 
involved would likely be more balanced. 
2.2.2 The economic argument  
 
Discounting the security necessities of maintaining a European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) there are direct and indirect economic 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
31
 European GNSS Supervisory Authority. Why Galileo? http://www.gsa.europa.eu/go/galileo/why-galileo 
32
 Jones, Seth G., The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge University Press:2007)p.163-164 
33
 Defence Industry Daily,  F-35 Lightning: The Joint Strike Fighter Programme (2012)  
34
Financial Times, ‘UK denied waiver on US arms technology’ (November 22nd  2005) &  
Reuters UK, ‘U.S: to withhold F-35 software code’ (November 25th  2009) 
35
 Ibid. 
36
Times, The. £500m ‘wasted’ on Chinooks that have never flown (June 4th 2008) 
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benefits that make it an imperative for Europe to maintain a competitive industry 
in this sector.  
Firstly, and perhaps most obviously there is the overall economic weight of 
the sector which provides many high skilled manufacturing as well as research 
and development jobs. As a collective whole the European DTIB has in recent 
years employed over 300,000 persons directly and seen annual profits of €55bn.37 
If one considers the jobs maintained indirectly through the supply chain it is 
estimated that the sector supports the employment of over 1.6 million people 
across the EU.38 
Secondly, the defence sector is highly innovative and is viewed by industrial 
policy makers as a direct way to boost a nation’s technological capabilities.39  
Indeed, some go as far as to say it is “an important mechanism for driving a 
country’s overall economic development and industrialisation”40 This has become 
increasingly pertinent as the high technology gains from the defence sector can 
have huge commercial value once they ‘spill-over’ into products aimed for 
civilian markets. Such dual-use technology is also important for maintaining 
economic growth and can give a leading edge to other high-tech areas of the 
economy such as electronics, transport, information and communications 
technologies, biotechnology and nanotechnology.41 Furthermore, this 
technological spill-over is seen as a vital constituent of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy 
to create economic growth and jobs on the medium term.42 With approximately 25 
million43 EU citizens without work in mid 2012 there is surely an imperative to 
leverage the gains of this strategy as best possible. 
2.3 Europe’s defence industry dilemma 
As the global arms industry has undergone a process of internationalisation 
European firms have faced immense competitive pressure from the goliath prime 
contractors across the Atlantic.44 This, when combined with declining defence  
budgets and hang over of excess production capacity45 from the Cold War era has 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
37
European Commission, A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry (2007) p.2 
38
Eurostrategies ,  A comprehensive analysis of emerging competences and skill needs for optimal preparation 
and management of change in the EU defence industry (2009)  
39
Taylor, T., In, The European Union and National Defence Policy, Edited by Jolyon Howorth and Anand 
Menon (Routledge, London:1997) p.135   
40
Bitzinger, Richard A., Towards a Brave New Arms Industry?, Adelphi Paper, 356, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (2003) p.13 
41
European Commission, A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry (2007) p.2 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Eurostat, European Unemployment (2012)  
44
 Camus, Philippe CEO EADS, Hertrich, Rainer CEO EADS, Ranque, Denis Chairman & CEO Thales & 
Turner Mike CEO BAE Systems, The new European Defence Agency: Getting above the Clouds (June  2004) 
45
 Bitzinger, Richard, Towards a Brave New Arms Industry?, Adelphi Paper, 356, Institute for International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (2003) p.5 
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led to the present scenario where Europe’s fragmented and nationally protected 
defence industries cannot expect to survive without reform. Indeed political and 
industrial elites have perceived this fragmentation competitiveness problem as an 
existential threat to the DTIB in Europe46 as R&D spending in US Aerospace and 
Defence companies yield nearly twice the financial return than that of European 
ones.47 
2.3.1 Fragmentation & duplication 
Realising the new budgetary environment of the post Cold War period the US 
consolidated its defence aerospace sector from 25 individual companies to just 
four global behemoths in the eight years to 1998.48 Further expounding the 
competitive pressure was that these four companies had more or less exclusive 
access to the largest single market and budget for defence equipment. The 
European’s response, even if aware of the pending competitive pressure and that 
autarky in arms production was becoming anachronistic and unsustainable, was 
continued protection of national suppliers.49 Consolidation if it occurred happened 
within Member States in what was presumably a scramble to create a national 
champion or two that might survive any eventual restructuring and consolidation 
at the European level. While this has no doubt helped and along the way led to the 
creation of some big European primes such as EADS, BAE Systems, Thales, 
Finmeccanica and Saab it still falls short of the reform needed.  
Fragmentation is still rife across Europe. After supply side consolidation in 
the nineties Europe still had ten armoured vehicle manufacturers, ten helicopter 
producers, eleven missile companies and fourteen Shipyards; in each of these 
categories the US had 5 or less.50 The demand side also remains fragmented as, 
aside from the odd collaboration, national procurement agencies act as 27 
autonomous entities spending on average 85% of their procurement budget within 
their own national borders.51  
Why is this fragmentation so destructive? Essentially it means that across 
Europe many weapons programmes are duplicated, sometimes several times. 
Duplication can happen at the R&D stage, in production facilities, in certification 
and leads ultimately to shorter inefficient production runs vis-a-vis the economies 
of scale reached in the US defence industry. This in effect results in European 
resources being spread much wider and thinner than comparative projects in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
46
 Jones, Seth G., The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge University Press:2007)p.169 
47
 Ben-Ari, G. & Zlatnik, M., Aerospace & Defence: Inventing and Selling the Next Generation, Center for 
Strategic & International Studies (May 12th 2009) p.1 
48
 Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 16 1998) p. 25 
49
 Salmon, Trevor C. & Shephard, Alistair J. K., Toward a European Army: A military power in the Making? 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder:2003) p.193 
50
 Dodd, T., European defence industrial and armaments cooperation. House of Commons library research 
paper no 97/15 (February 4th 1997) 
51
 European Commission, A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry (2007) p.4 
 16 
 
US. For example, in Europe there are currently 89 unique major weapons 
platforms under development while in the US there are 27.52 Keeping in mind that 
the US defence budget is more than double than that of Europe’s fragmented total 
and that it outspends Europe by 3 to 153 on procurement and by 6 to 154 on 
defence R&D, it should come as little surprise that the EU DTIB is under 
competitive pressure. This is critical as the financial viability of many European 
defence programmes hang on the success of lucrative export sales.55 
Consolidation in demand and supply must take place or European companies and 
defence programmes will lack the scale and capital needed to develop systems 
that can compete both technologically and on cost with those from the US or 
indeed other rising powers. 
2.3.2 Escaping the dilemma 
How does Europe move forward to strengthen its DTIB and enable it to supply 
cutting edge equipment to Member State armed forces at a viable and sustainable 
cost? As argued earlier in this chapter, dependency on non-EU suppliers it not a 
viable solution from either a security or economic perspective; this leaves EU 
Member States with no other option than to collaborate a view wide held among 
European policy makers.56  
Yet collaboration has its different forms; traditionally EU Member States have 
come together on joint multinational procurement programmes in an attempt to 
pool demand and benefit from the associated economies of scale. Although this 
strategy has yielded some successes in terms of technologically competitive 
products, it has ultimately failed to deliver a sustainable long term solution. Thus 
the new approach has been to integrate the until recently exempt defence 
procurement ever more into the Single Market. 
The past half century is dotted with institutions set up to manage joint 
procurement efforts such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD), the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), Western 
European Armaments Group (WEAG), Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en 
matière d'Armement (OCCAR).  Ultimately all these institutions failed to deliver 
meaningful restructuring in the defence industry as they did not attempt or did not 
effectively succeed in eliminating the principle of juste retour which has 
hampered most collaborative procurements programmes to date.57 Under this 
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principle each participating Member State receives, at every stage of the project, a 
corresponding amount of jobs and contracts (based on man hours and value) to its 
overall investment.58 Thereby suppliers are seldom selected for their expertise or 
price but rather because a given Member State in a multinational collaborative project 
needs its allotted share of the work. In many cases final production lines are built in 
each participating state59 and even sub components are developed and produced by 
multilateral participating nation consortia.60 Add to this international logistics and 
multilateral international management costs61 and many cost savings from pooled 
R&D spending and long production runs will most likely have evaporated. 
Ultimately the level of national protectionism sustained throughout many of the 
collaborative procurement projects means they have had a negligible effect on 
restructuring and consolidation in the European DTIB and have arguably served 
to perpetuate the status quo of its fragmented structure rather than bringing any 
wholesale change through cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Post-millennium the focus on collaboration efforts shifted towards the 
objective of creating a single European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). The 
logic was to integrate the hereto exempt defence sector more comprehensively 
into EU single market rules thereby obliging procurement agencies to provide fair 
and transparent tendering procedures. As countless researchers in this field such 
as Guay & Callum62; Hartley63; Jones64; Mörth & Britz65; and Hoeffler66 have 
noted, the root and persisting cause of Europe’s fragmented defence markets and 
industries can be linked unequivocally to Articles 346 TFEU (ex 296 TEC). Part 1 
(a) States that; 
 
“no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which 
it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security”67 
 
With part (b) adding that 
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“any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not 
adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding 
products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.” 
 
Part (b) refers to an extensive list of defence equipment dating back to 1958 to 
which Article 346 TFEU is applicable. In principle, Article 346 should not be a 
wide-ranging, industry-encompassing automatic exemption. Rather, each defence 
procurement contract should, in theory, be assessed on a case-by-case basis 
judging its sensitivity to the given Member States national security concerns if an 
exemption is sought.68 However, this is far from the reality in which Member 
States have taken a very liberal definition of “essential security interests” and 
blanket derogation has been the rule rather than the exception.69 
In order to establish a Europe wide ‘single market’ for defence equipment it 
has thus been imperative to try and limit the excessive use of Article 346. Hoeffler 
observes that it has been the target of European Commission initiatives on five 
separate occasions70or six if one includes the most recent Defence Procurement 
Directive 2009/81/EC. Alongside the Commission’s efforts the EDA was set up in 
2004 in part with one of its central objectives being the establishment of an 
EDEM.71  This finally brought the field of defence industry policy into the EU 
framework, and thereby codified the process begun back in the 1990’s.72 By late 
2005 the EDA had launched its Code of Conduct on defence procurement that 
sought by way of a voluntary soft law commitment to open up defence 
procurement and limit Article 346 use as a first step towards establishing a true 
EDEM. It is this CoC along with its complimentary European Bulletin Board 
(EBB) of contracts that this paper shall seek to assess.  
2.4 Ambition & scope of the study 
Considerable research has been conducted on the changing structure, as well as 
the fragmentation, deficiencies, and challenges facing the European DTIB. Others 
have focused on the Europeanization of the policy area, while yet another group 
have sought to assess the merits of European collaborative projects. However, 
little has been done to evaluate more recent efforts towards the marketization of 
defence procurement at the EU level.  
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For example, Guay & Callum73, Hayward74, Meijer75 and Vlachos-Dengler76 
have all explored causal pressures behind European defence industry 
consolidation of the 1990’s that saw the emergence of a quad global players; 
namely EADS, BAE Systems, Finmeccanica and Thales.77 While others such as 
Schmitt78, Barrinha79 and Giegerich80 have focused on the European DTIB 
‘existential threat’ discourse which has driven European efforts to move beyond 
the consolidation of the 1990’s and create a true EDEM. There has also been 
considerable investigation into the Europeanization of defence industrial policy by 
the likes of Hoeffler81, Britz & Eriksson82, and Mawdsley83. This is the process 
whereby national systems including institutions, policies and even the polity itself 
orientate themselves towards the EU level, while helping to shape the emerging 
field in the process.84 A more recent paper by Britz85 has explored, specifically, 
the role of marketisation in the process of defence industrial policy 
Europeanization. This is a very timely contribution as EDA and Commission 
efforts have converged on liberalising defence procurement across Europe with 
the eventual aim of creating a true single EDEM.86  
What is notable about the research in this field is the lack of any quantitative 
assessment of how this policy of ‘marketizing’ towards an EDEM is faring. Past 
studies such as those by Hartley87 and Donaldson88 investigated the merits of 
European multinational collaborative projects of the type that have dominated 
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cooperation since the end of Cold War and Jones89 has shown that intra European 
collaboration has taken preponderance over collaboration with other regions, 
however his figures do not inform us on developments after 2000. Indeed, Hartley 
has noted that finding quantitative data for the defence sector is a tough challenge 
in itself.90 Defence companies and procurement agencies are not necessarily the 
most transparent actors in the economy and it is often difficult to separate a large 
conglomerate’s civil sales from it defence ones. This paper naturally faces the 
same constraints as others with regards to sourcing viable quantitative data and is 
therefore utilising an open source database maintained by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute which aims to track all international arms 
transfers.91 Although as open source database it can never be perfect, it should be 
safe to say that among the 27 EU Member States in the post cold war period is not 
likely to have omitted many cases of transfers.  
The primary aim of this paper is to conduct a baseline study policy evaluation 
of the EDA’s 2005 CoC on Defence Procurement and the corresponding EBB set 
up to facilitate its objectives. Broadly speaking the question sought to be 
answered will be;  
 
Has the EDA’s CoC had any success in promoting marketization in the field of 
defence procurement?  
 
The analysis will focus on whether the measures have been successful in 
promoting intra-European trade in defence goods. This cross-border trade will be 
the key indicator of marketization and treated as a proxy of whether governments 
and their procurement agencies have adopted policies of ‘fair and equal’ treatment 
of suppliers as pledged in the CoC.92 The study will involve two parts: a 
quantitative trade analysis and a series of qualitative interviews. 
 The first part of the study will involve mapping quantitative trade data to 
display the levels of intra-EU arms transfers pre and post 2006 in search of 
discrepancies. This type of baseline comparative analysis is not dissimilar in 
principle to the approach used by the European Commission to measure the 
impact of its new Directives on the single market.93 This part of the study will 
broadly seek to answer the question;  
 
Have levels of cross-border trade in defence equipment increased among the 27 
Member States of the EU? 
  
In addition to this quantitative approach this study will also seek to gather 
qualitative data by way of expert interviews. This addition is necessary in order to 
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clarify any questions of equifinality that may arise should the result of the 
quantitative enquiry display a noticeable rise in cross border trade. This is to say; 
in the myriad of collaborative procurement efforts, an interpretative 
communication, and Court of Justice case law, how can one be sure that a rise in 
cross-border trade can be attributable to the EDA’s CoC? Indeed, with the 
quantitative method alone it cannot be. Thus the objective of the interviews is to 
gain an insight, from economic actors on both the supply and demand side of the 
sector as well as from policy practitioners on the National and EU level, as to 
whether the pledges of the CoC have been successful in bringing about a change 
in behaviour. Broadly speaking, this part of the study shall seek to answer the 
question; 
 
Has the EDA’s CoC led to a change in the protectionist defence procurement 
preferences of Member States? 
 
This study therefore aims to answer two unique questions that are to my best 
knowledge yet to be investigated in the sphere of academia. Furthermore, it seeks 
to provide a quantitative insight in field that has thus far, and for good reason, 
been somewhat lacking in this regard.  
Finally, many Europeans both pro-EU and Eurosceptic are often hesitant 
about even discussing matters related to defence and the dirty word ‘superstate’ or 
visions of an imperial ‘European army’ are suddenly part of the discussion. Thus 
for those who equate the quest for an EDEM as a move toward a centralised 
supranational army, Giegerich provides a terse response;  
 
“Greater collaboration among European governments is not about creating a 
European army. The motivation should not be ideological, but hard-nosed 
pragmatism: cooperation is about delivering usable capabilities at better value 
for money to ensure that the inevitable period of constrained resources does not 
lead to the downgrading of European defence capabilities.”
94 
 
Indeed the motivation should be penny pinching. Although an unfortunate 
necessity, the production of defence equipment is not as beneficial to society as 
the tangible gains of schools or hospitals. Therefore efforts should therefore be 
made to make it as efficient and cost effective as possible.   
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3 Methodology  
3.1 A multi-strategy research design 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in order to answer the research problem 
fully and with any degree of certainty, it was necessary to utilize more than one 
method. Thus a Multi-Strategy or Mixed Methodology research design was 
employed. The two methods being: 1. the use of exploratory data analysis and 
descriptive statistics to determine whether there has been an increase in the cross 
border trade of conventional weapons in the EU, and 2. A series of semi-
structured expert interviews to determine whether the expected rise in trade can be 
attributed with any certainty to the actions of the EDA. To further define this 
research design it is worth considering the differing classifications of multi-
strategy research put forward by Hammersley in 199695 and Morgan in 199896. 
Hammersley suggests there are three broad approaches towards mutli-
strategy research dubbed: Facilitation, Complementarity, and Triangulation. 
Facilitation is rather loosely defined as “employing one research strategy in order 
to aid research using the other strategy”97 whereas Complementarity “occurs when 
the two research strategies are employed in order that different aspect of an 
investigation can be dovetailed”98. Finally, and probably of most use in 
highlighting the approach used in this study, there is Triangulation. It is defined as 
the “use of quantitative research to corroborate qualitative research findings or 
vice versa”99. This study is indeed representative of the ‘vice versa’ in that the 
primary purpose of the qualitative semi-structured expert interviews is to 
determine equifinality in the findings provided by the quantitative investigation.  
Morgan’s classification system of approaches to multi-strategy research 
design has four delineations. In his approach he determines which of the methods, 
qualitative or quantitative, is principle and which is complimentary as well as 
which one is preliminary and which one is follow-up.100 This double 
categorisation of how the qualitative and quantitative methods are placed and 
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interact with one another in the overall research design, in terms of Priority and 
Sequence, provides a rather neat matrix that describes the four possible outcomes. 
See Fig 1.101 below.  
According to Morgan’s classification this study would be defined as method 
number three in the matrix. That is to say, if we consider the priority decision, the 
quantitative investigation into the levels of cross border trade in conventional 
weapons represents the principle method and the semi-structured expert 
interviews represent the complementary method. Turning to the sequence 
decision: the quantitative study will be preliminary and the qualitative study will 
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be the follow-up. Bryman 2004 actually advises that the priority decision should 
be governed by which ever method is the principle data collection tool.102 
Admittedly, using this advice alone it would be difficult to determine which part 
of this study was the principle. However, a closer look at Morgan’s explanations 
for the purpose of the different methods provides clarification. He states that when 
using method number three the qualitative study is used as a follow up to evaluate 
and interpret the results found in proceeding quantitative study as well as explain 
poorly understood results or outliers.103 This describes, more or less, the exact role 
that the quantitative and the qualitative methods will play in this multi-strategy 
research design. Thus this study would be representative or Type 3 in Morgan’s 
grid. 
 
3.1.1 Critiques of multi-strategy research 
 
Despite growing popularity within the field of social sciences multi-strategy or 
mixed methods research is not without its detractors. Bryman 2004 identifies two 
main camps that challenge the mixing of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Firstly, the embedded methods argument stipulates that the researchers choice of 
method and therewith their approach to data collection leads to a firm 
commitment to an epistemological position which will be irreconcilable with the 
differing position committed to by the ‘other’ method used.104 Secondly, and 
closely linked is the paradigm argument. Here the qualitative & quantitative 
research fields each occupy a paradigm sphere in which they have their own 
incompatible methods, values and epistemological assumptions.105 The end result 
is that mixed method research is essentially only taking place in one of these 
paradigms and on a superficial level. Bryman notes that there are rather central 
flaws to both these accusation. For the former there is little evidence to prove that 
methods are inextricably locked to certain epistemological positions and for the 
latter there is doubt as to whether the qualitative and quantitative research camps 
in fact constitute paradigms.106 Pearce adds that “proponents of the metaphysical 
paradigm often assert that the two paradigms create incompatible kinds of 
knowledge, but this argument fails on multiple levels and disregards the practical 
considerations and many successes of actual research”107.   
Indeed it seems that mixed methods research has become much more popular, or 
‘acceptable’, in recent years and while their merits have been shown Bryman 
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warns against it being perceived as a universally applicable panacea. He warns 
that more methods and more data are poor substitutes for a good research design 
and that mixed methods should not imply any sort of superiority over a well 
conducted mono-method approach.108 For this study the motivation for the use of 
the mixed methods approach is largely very straightforward. It was not possible to 
answer the research problem fully without using more than one method. 
Revisiting the problem: Has the EDA’s CoC had any success in promoting 
marketization in the field of defence procurement? (using cross-border trade as a 
key indicator) 
 Clearly, the quantitative method deployed can determine whether there has 
been a significant change in the intra-EU conventional weapons trade, however, it 
sheds little light on what has been the cause of this rise as there are several 
complex dynamics that might affect this level of trade. The Qualitative method by 
contrast cannot provide any meaningful empirical evidence on the rise or fall in 
trade between 27 different countries yet should provide an insight into whether the 
EDA’s CoC can be attributed as a leading causal instrument in any changes in 
behaviour observed. Thus the two methods employed in this study are 
complimentary but also wholly necessary if one is to attempt to answer the 
research problem. 
3.1.2 What kind of output? 
When embarking on this study considerable thought was expended on whether it 
is ultimately deductive or inductive. That is to say, is the ambition of the study to 
confirm or reject a held or developed hypothesis within a deductive and wholly 
positivist framework? Or is the ambition, by way of induction, to develop a theory 
from the observations in the data collected?109  Unfortunately, the answer is not 
straightforward as it effectively comprises elements of both.  
For example, if we look at the quantitative part of the study first: its 
primary purpose to test the hypothesis that the EDA’s CoC has led to a rise in the 
level of intra EU trade in conventional weapons. This represents largely a text 
book approach to deductive study. Turning to the qualitative semi-structured 
expert interviews: the primary ambition is to help interpret any rise in trade 
observed in the first part of the study and determine whether this change can be 
attributed to the impact of the EDA’s CoC. Here the approach is slightly different 
as there may be various explanations as to why there has been a rise in trade 
levels, should indeed a rise be the trend observed. Again the primary objective 
will be deductive in the sense that it will seek to verify, yay or nay, whether the 
CoC had an effective impact on any rise in trade levels. However, should the CoC 
not be deemed the instrumental cause behind such a rise in trade then there will 
arise an inductive element to this study. Data from the qualitative study may 
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present insights which go some way to help in the formulation of a new theory for 
the hypothesised rise in trade levels of conventional weapons. In addition to 
answering the basic yay or nay, as to whether there has been a significant rise in 
trade levels, the quantitative study will involve Exploratory Data Analysis that is 
fundamentally inductive in nature as it seeks to find patterns in data without a 
predefined hypothesis.110 
3.2 Quantitative – confirmatory & exploratory data 
analysis 
This part of the study will conduct secondary analysis, both confirmatory and 
exploratory, on a dataset derived from the arms transfers’ database maintained by 
the SIPRI. Although a necessity, given the limited available sources of statistical 
data on arms transfers not to mention the scope of this paper, secondary analysis 
provides distinct advantages. Firstly, it provides high quality data versus little cost 
or time invested.111 This is crucial as it enables the second part of this study to 
focus on the time consuming activity of conducting expert interviews. Secondly, it 
enables the possibility for longitudinal analysis. This is crucial for this study as it 
permits the mapping of intra-EU trade arms trade levels in time periods leading up 
to the EDA’s CoC and can thus act as a control when comparing to the period 
after. 
As stated previously, the primary aim of the quantitative part of this study 
will be to determine whether or not there has been a rise in the intra-EU trade in 
conventional weapons since 2006 as a proxy for the occurrence of marketization. 
This can be deemed as run of the mill confirmatory data analysis. Once the data 
has been collected and transformed this test ought to be relatively straightforward. 
The secondary aim will be to conduct a form of exploratory data analysis on the 
dataset in order to search for interesting trends. While some have defined 
exploratory data analysis as involving prescribed statistical or computational tools 
for the preliminary analysis of one’s data112, this will not be the definition 
employed here. Rather this study will utilize the definition provided by its 
founding father John Tukey who insisted that “Exploratory Data Analysis is an 
attitude, flexibility, and a reliance on display, NOT a bundle of techniques, and 
should be so taught.”113 Tukey was concerned that social science and even the 
natural sciences seldom begin with a tidy straightforward question. He emphasises 
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that most questions or hypothesis are derived from what he calls ‘quasi-
theoretical’ insights that are most often based on the ‘best available’ past data. 
There are two main reasons for this approach to be applied in this study. Firstly, it 
may be possible to discover trends that help to deal with questions of equifinality 
that may arise, should the qualitative study provide an equivocal answer. 
Secondly, once the data set has been compiled and transformed, it would seem a 
terrible waste to only confirm or reject the initial hypothesis. Thus it is expected 
that such exploration might throw up trends that are inherently interesting and if 
not a direct aid to this study may be found useful in further studies. 
3.2.1 Data - sourcing and limitations 
Possibly the most daunting task when embarking on the quantitative part of this 
study was where to find the data. Although improving through outlets such as the 
EU Annual Report on Arms Exports, access to hard economic data on the defence 
sector can be less than straightforward to find.114 National government statistics 
may provide this sort of data but trying to patch such statistics together into a 
coherent dataset would be well beyond the task of this paper and more the scope 
of a doctoral study. National records would undoubtedly be uneven or patchy in 
their completeness as well as different in scope and method. Thus it became clear 
that a single source database or some form of collated statistics would be 
necessary.  
In terms of compiled import-export data on the trade of arms between all 
EU Member States there are few sources to be found. For this study only two 
potential sources were found. One was the EU Annual Report on Arms Exports 
and the other was the SIPRI Trade Indicator Value (TIV) database of international 
arms transfers. Despite the EU Annual Report providing accurate official statistics 
several other factors made the open source SIPRI database a more suitable choice 
for this study.  
The first has to do with the longitudinal investigation that will be part of 
this study. That is to say this study aims to cast its eye back to 1994 when looking 
at intra-EU arms transfers. As the EU Annual Report was only first published in 
1999 this limits its use considerably. The SIPRI database by contrast has yearly 
statistics dating back to 1950.115 Secondly, it was not until the fourth EU Annual 
Report in 2002116 that exports were broken down on a country by country basis, a 
feature that the SIPRI database has from the start. For this study it is critical to 
know where the exports are going and not just the total sum of exports from any 
given EU country. Thirdly, the SIPRI database has all values regardless of year or 
currency represented in 1990’s US$ prices. This permits the easy observation of 
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trends in arms flows over time without being concerned with inflation or in what 
currency the trade was made in.117 While the EU Annual Reports does show 
values in Euros they have no such price adjustment and are often riddled with 
omissions of what the final export value actually was for a given transfer. 
Considering these factors, it is apparent that the SIPRI database provides the best 
statistics for the purposes of this study. 
 While the SIPRI database enables this study to reach far beyond what 
would be conceivable was the author to collect his own data on 18 years of arms 
transfers between 27 nations it also has its limitations. Firstly, the values it 
contains are not the actual transactions of the arms transfers; rather they are  
nominal values assigned using SIPRI’s own unique algorithm that assigns values 
to certain types of armaments based on a combination of known unit production 
costs of a core set of weapons plus inputs for age and performance.118 While this 
is highly useful for exploring changing trends over time it does not permit for any 
comparison to actual economic values such as GDP figures, defence expenditure, 
or even national statistics on weapons exports. Furthermore the TIV can never be 
perfectly exact, as final sale costs may deviate from SIPRI calculations.  
Secondly, as it is open source there is of course a risk of omissions in the data, 
however, one would expect this to be low or non-existent among EU Member 
States, where the trade in defence goods is relatively transparent. However, 
provided error rates in valuation and omissions are to a certain degree constant 
across the data set then this should not void its trend generating capacity. 
Ultimately one has to try and work with the best data one can find. In this case, 
and despite the flaws listed, the SIPRI TIV database still provides the most 
suitable data for this study.  
 
3.2.2 Transformation & operationalisation 
Once the data had been sourced it was necessary to transform it into a 
form from which overall trends could be observed. The SIPRI TIV database can 
generate an import or export list to or from any one given country. For example, 
one can select imports to the UK, then select the preferred time span and the 
database will generate an excel table listing the value of imports, classified by 
country of origin and year they were imported. An example of such an import TIV 
table can be seen in Annex 1. One of these TIV import tables was generated for 
each of the current 27 EU Member States dating back to 1994119. The next step 
was to compile a yearly EU import sum for each Member States by adding all the 
EU originated imports for a given year into a single total. Once this had been 
executed, all Member State yearly totals for EU originated imports were compiled 
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into a single table, visible in Annex 2. From this table it is now possible to 
calculate the sum of all EU originating imports to all 27 Member States or in other 
words: the annual TIV sum of all cross-border trade in conventional weapons 
among the EU 27 from 1994 to 2011. From this dataset the quantitative part of our 
problem/hypothesis can now be tested. 
To investigate the eighteen year period from 1994 to 2011 represented in 
the table it was segmented into six year periods and totals for each period were 
calculated. This helps to even out any anomaly/outlier years and permits the direct 
comparison of the pre and post EDA CoC era. Our hypothesis predicts that a rise 
in intra-EU trade levels will be observable in the six years after the CoC (2006-
2011) in comparison to the previous six years before it (2000-2005). This 
expectation is based on the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage whereby, 
when markets are open suppliers will be chosen based on how cost effectively 
they can produce a given good relative to the other suppliers in the market.120 In 
other words: procurement will flow cross-border to the supplier that can produce 
that item at the best value. Thus tanks might be predominantly supplied by the 
Germans, helicopters by the Italians and electronics by the French.  In addition it 
is also necessary to compare the 2000-2005 period with the six years preceding it 
(1994-1999). This can be useful as it will help contextualise any rise observed 
after 2006 with the wider historical trajectory; i.e. is the rise extraordinary due to 
the EDA’s CoC or has the intra-EU arms trade been rising steadily at the same 
rate since the end of the Cold War as suggested by Jones 2007121. The three 
periods of investigation will henceforth be referred to as P1 (1994-1999), P2 
(2000-2005) and P3 (2006-2011). 
 In addition exploratory data analysis was undertaken. This had no wholly 
predetermined plan, but rather involved the drawing of various other tables and 
graphical representations of the data to generate among other things, which EU 
member is the biggest arms supplier to other EU Member States and which is the 
biggest importer. Furthermore as a by product of transforming the data it was also 
relatively easy to include EU import tables from third party states in order to 
observe how this trend has developed alongside intra-EU trading. 
3.3 Qualitative - semi-structured expert interviews 
This part of the study aimed to determine if the EDA’s CoC played a significant 
role in any rise in intra-EU arms transfers observed in the first part of the study. 
Furthermore, should the EDA’s CoC be deemed superfluous as an explanatory 
factor then the follow on aim is to forage for other causal explanations. Although 
the data from the quantitative study may indicate a cause and effect link between 
the CoC and a rise in trade by way of timing this link will be at best tenuous as the 
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CoC is far from the only factor that may have had an impact. Hence the 
explanatory power of the quantitative study has reached its limits and it is 
necessary to speak those who are knowledgeable in this field. Given that the 
business of arms production and purchase is somewhat of a niche activity when 
viewed alongside civilian markets it was clear from the start that only expert 
interviews would be useful in trying to address the research problem; i.e. a general 
representative from a trade ministry or chamber of commerce might be able to 
comment on the level of trade in the defence sector but is highly unlikely to have 
the intricate knowledge necessary to tackle the questions of this study.  However, 
provided relevant ones can be found, experts can provide insights into processes 
and effects that are not necessarily observable to those, who are so to speak, on 
the outside. They may have spent years or even decades working in the field and 
will have aggregated considerable specific knowledge that is unavailable 
elsewhere. Furthermore, provided one manages to find and connect with experts 
relevant to ones enquiry chances are that the interview process will yield high 
results; you and your interviewee will most likely share a common scientific 
background and mutual understanding of the systems that you intend to discuss.122 
In the case of this study this final point was particularly noticeable in all 
interviews conducted. 
Why semi-structured interviews? This method was chosen as it provides the 
flexibility and freedom for the interviewer to seek clarification and elaboration on 
answers given, as well as probe beyond the more rigid script of a questionnaire or 
structured interview should the respondent bring up issues of interest that are 
unexpected.123 This is a particularly valuable asset when the expert interviewed 
may possess a considerable knowledge advantage over the interviewer and can 
provide answers to the research problem that the interviewer might have missed. 
Whereas questionnaires and structured interviews are aimed towards collecting 
standardized answers that can be quickly coded and processed, the objective in 
semi-structured interviews is much more to listen to the respondent’s point of 
view124. This is particularly pertinent as the issues to be discussed are complex in 
nature and are therefore unlikely to have simple or concise codifiable answers. 
Additionally, as the respondents in this study came from varied backgrounds there 
was no standardised questioning; rather each interview guide was to a certain 
degree tailored to the position and expected knowledge specialisation of the 
expert. 
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3.3.1 Data – sampling & collection  
By targeting experts for their knowledge sampling was decidedly purposive rather 
than randomized, stratified or convenience based. That is to say, the experts were 
sampled for their direct relevance and perceived ability to provide answers 
relevant to the research question.125 In order to gain insights from as wide a 
spectrum as possible (within the defence field of defence procurement) it was 
decided to attempt to achieve a broad sample. The resulting entities were targeted 
for interviews:  
 
• Those on the policy making side: namely, the EDA who produced the 
CoC and the European Commission who have long eyed the defence 
sector their prerogative as part of the single market and have after repeated 
initiatives finally wrestled the policy area away from Member States. 
 
• Those economic actors on who the policy has effect: 
o Demand side: such as ministries of defence and procurement 
agencies who are obliged to act accordingly with the pledges made 
in the CoC and are if you like the ‘targets’ of the measures. 
o Supply side: suppliers of defence and security materials, national 
level industry associations, and defence orientated export agencies. 
 
In the end, interview requests were sent to 40 entities across ten different 
countries between June and July of 2012. With an effective response rate of 
27.5% eleven interviews were secured. Three were with policy makers (one EDA 
and two at the European Commission); three were national level defence industry 
associations; two were with defence contractors (one prime, one medium sized); 
two were with defence related export agencies; and finally, one with a 
procurement agency. 
Although the final response rate is respectable, there were considerable 
difficulties making inroads with defence contractors. Whereas public servants or 
policy makers may feel obliged to respond to academic requests126, there seems to 
be little such culture among most defence contractors. Some already ward off the 
potential researcher blanket warning that they “do not respond to academic 
requests”. With others contact was made but then cancelled as the information 
would be considered classified. To get a picture of how difficult this was: of the 
40 requests, 26 were actually sent to contractors yet these yielded only two 
interviews. Thus the isolated response rate for defence contractors alone was a 
much more meagre 7.7%. 
 The interviews were conducted by telephone between July and October 
2012. They averaged 35 minutes in length with the shortest lasting 26 minutes and 
the longest 48.  All in all, the knowledge of those interviewed exceeded 
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expectations considerably. Although it was expected that the policy makers would 
have intricate knowledge of the issues surrounding the research problem of this 
study, it was less expected from the other respondents. Or let’s say it was far less 
expected to be able to find connect to the person with that exact knowledge in the 
other organisations contacted. This may be in part attributable to the request mail 
which succinctly outlined the aims of the research in as clear a manner as 
possible. Additionally, a few of the organisations responded first in order to ask 
further questions upon which they then proceeded to search for the appropriate 
respondent within their organisation. Although preparations had been made to 
record the interview through the use of voice over IP (VOIP) calling in 
combination with recording software, this ultimately did not happen. The 
interviews had been agreed on the basis of anonymity and after the request to 
record was made and rejected in the agreement and planning of the first four 
interviews it was abandoned and no longer pursued. This was proved to be a 
disappointment as the benefits of recording are numerous127. Two factors most 
likely played into this preference to remain unrecorded. Firstly, the nature of the 
field remains sensitive and secondly, having arranged everything by email and 
having never met in person it is understandable that respondents had qualms about 
being recorded. Notes, notes and more notes were made during the interviews and 
typed up immediately after. This set up was far from desirable as questions from 
the interview guides were routinely deviated from and tangents were embarked on 
during the interview process. However, this was the reality faced and every effort 
was made to type up the notes as immediately and accurately as possible.  
3.3.2 Operationalisation 
What sorts of questions were asked to determine if the EDA’s CoC has had a 
significant impact on increasing the intra-EU trade of conventional weapons? This 
largely depended on the profile of the respondent. However, some of the general 
questions asked of most respondents were: 
 
Have you heard of the EDA’s CoC and corresponding EBB of defence 
contracts? 
 
Do you believe the EDA’s CoC has led to a decrease in the use of Article 346? 
 
Has the CoC led to a change in behaviour on the part of Governments, i.e. 
have suppliers been treated in a fair and equal manner? 
 
Do you feel all Member States have implemented the pledges of the CoC to the 
same extent? 
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When interviewing the defence contractors or national industry associations there 
was also more scope for asking indirect questions to which the answer may be 
indicative in itself, such as: 
 
Have your seen a rise in exports to the EU over the past 5-6 years? 
 
Have you lost contracts in other EU Member States in which you feel your 
company clearly had the better offer but was subject to national bias in the 
final outcome?  
 
Has your company won contracts on the EBB? 
 
When interviewing the policy makers, the questioning focused more on how 
they have measured the outcome of their own work and whether they think it 
has been effective, whereas with ministries or procurement agencies the 
questioning sought to determine which steps they had taken to implement the 
CoC in their modus operandi. 
 In all cases the primary focus was on whether or not the EDA’s CoC had 
played a significant role, however, in expectation of competing explanations 
the secondary focus of the interviews was to determine if the respondents 
believed any other factor could explain the trends observed. These questions 
varied from the specific in order to assess the role of the Court of Justice cases 
in this field: 
 
Has your company pursued legal action to challenge the unjust loss of a 
contract in another Member State? 
 
Has there been a rise in COJ cases related to defence procurment in recent 
years? 
 
To the most general: 
 
Can you provide any explanation for the rise of intra-EU trade in 
conventional weapons? 
 
Typically the interviews guides consisted of between 8 and 12 questions, yet 
inevitably on some interviews these were extended upon considerably as 
dialogue developed. Once all the interviews were conducted and notes typed 
up the data was re-read to determine if there was a decisive conclusion on how 
the CoC has been perceived and whether it can be judged to have had an 
impact or not. 
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Also noteworthy for the purposes of this study is that the 65.37% increase 
observed between periods 2 and 3 is considerably more than the 19.08% rise 
between periods 1 and 2. Thus we can speak of accelerating growth in the 
volume of intra-EU trade in conventional weapons. What is clear is that more 
trade is going cross-border among EU states. This indicates that marketization, as 
defined by Hoeffler128, of some form is occurring; i.e. the preference of cost-
effective procurement and an open attitude towards defence markets is leading to 
more cross-border trade as protectionism becomes less rife across the sector. Yet 
this does not necessarily mean that the CoC is responsible for the acceleration; 
indeed, growing trust among Member States may have a reinforcing effect, which 
over time leads to more and more trade with one another in the defence sector.  
4.1.1 Discounting the eastern enlargement 
After the millennium the EU undertook it’s so called big bang or Eastern 
enlargement. The union expanded, welcoming ten new Member States in 2004 
and adding a further two in 2007. Intuitively one might come to the conclusion 
that it was this expansion of the union which led to the rises observed as 120 
million+ new citizens129 with their 12 militaries joined the Single Market. This 
however is not the case and is clearly demonstrable by comparing stats of the EU-
15 and Eastern enlargement 12. There are two figures which can help explain this.  
Firstly, looking at the Eastern enlargement states’ share of exports in the entire 
intra-EU trade of conventional weapons one thing is strikingly clear: it is 
negligible. Across the three periods as a whole Eastern enlargement countries 
exports made up just 0.7% of all intra-EU transfers, see graph 2. Not only this, 
but it appears that exports from the Eastern enlargement countries to the EU-27 
have actually declined across the three periods meaning that in the post CoC  3rd 
period from 2006-2011 exports fell to just 0.1% of the intra-EU total. This 
collapse in exports may be in part explained by the competitive pressures faced by 
the formerly state monopolized defence sectors that remained in many of the 
enlargement countries as a legacy of the Soviet era. Indeed, during one of the 
interviews with a specialist from a national-level defence industry association of a 
medium sized Eastern enlargement country, the responded noted that defence 
industrial capacity had fallen to about 10% of its 1990 level in his country.130 
Although many states both west and east European reduced defence industrial 
capacity after the cold war, this contraction is particularly stark. 
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4.2 Qualitative results: explaining causality?  
Despite the rather remarkable changes in trade levels witnessed between the pre 
and post-COC periods the experts consulted expressed little confidence in the 
tentative theory that this soft law instrument could have had such a marked effect. 
Although some conceded that it may have had a very limited impact, pessimism 
that national governments could change their protectionist behaviour seemed to be 
the prevailing view and ultimately no resoundingly positive perceptions of the 
CoC were put forward by respondents. 
4.2.1 Views from the policy makers 
The policy makers from the European Commission and the EDA noted that it is 
indeed very difficult to measure the impact of the CoC in terms of its impact on 
cross-border trade and conceded that they had not attempted to do this.131 The first 
attempt to measure progress in the process of marketizing the European defence 
sector by reviewing trade levels has in fact only been recently outsourced by the 
Commission for assessing the impact of its own 2009/81/EC defence procurement 
directive.132 
Notably, when asked in general terms what impact they perceive the CoC has 
had the respondents did not cite cross border trade as a success factor. Rather they 
focused on how the CoC promoted transparency and openness to the process of 
defence procurement.133 A legal officer from DG MARKT at the European 
Commission noted that “it promoted transparency” and “helped pave the way for 
other initiatives”134, while the markets specialist from the EDA highlighted that it 
was unique as the first attempt at a genuinely market based solution opposed to 
the collaborative efforts seen so far and argued that this made it a “a first real step 
in the right direction from a historical point of view”135. 
However, when pressed more specifically on whether the CoC had led to an 
increase in cross-border trade or whether it had led to a reduction in the use of 
Article 346 the overall picture painted was one of little progress. The EDA did 
observe increasing cross-border awards on the EBB136, however, without knowing 
what number of contracts went cross-border before the CoC & EBB started this 
doesn’t necessarily indicate more than the fact that Member States are using the 
EBB as their primary advertising space. It also doesn’t factor in how many 
contracts went cross-border outside the EBB. When asked if it had a real impact 
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on Intra-EU arms transfers the EDA markets specialist said “no.... the volume of 
cross-border trade in the defence sector remains very limited”137. This view was 
echoed by the respondent from DG Enterprise and Industry who argued that 
clearly the 2009/81/EC was a reaction to the inadequacies of the CoC.138 
Unfortunately, the EDA did not monitor the implementation of CoC principles in 
Member State behaviour so there is little insight to whether or not efforts were 
made to change procurement policy or not.139 
In terms of trying to explain the lack of progress the EDA respondent noted 
that sovereignty and security of supply issues still divide EU Member States and 
that there is a need to develop a mutual trust “there has been centuries of national 
states producing their own arms, this doesn’t just change overnight  with a law”. 
Furthermore, there remain huge barriers in terms of language and local procuring 
specificities that make it both costly and risky for companies to compete in cross 
border tenders where the odds are stacked against them and outcome is either 
decisive win or a total loss, but little in between.140 The Commission respondents 
by contrast believed that the CoC had little chance as a soft law instrument noting 
that non-binding and intergovernmental methods are not usually very effective in 
securing compliance. The respondent from DG MARKT answered quite bluntly 
that “50 years of single market experience has shown that the community method 
with binding law is how we build markets”.141 This interpretation likens the 
problem of creating a common market to the collective action problems posed by 
the prisoner’s dilemma.142 Or in other terms: there is a big free rider risk. Member 
States are aware that their defence production capacity is too large and costly to 
maintain143, yet action will require them to specialise and cede market share of 
one type of defence material to another Member State. As defence procurement is 
not as regular as grocery shopping exchanges in goods and concessions of market 
share may have to be diffuse and to some degree asymmetrical. This is where the 
risk lies for the Member States; i.e. if Member State A agrees to buy exceptionally 
good tanks from Member State B at the cost of their own uncompetitive national 
tank producer going bust what guarantee will they have that state B will buy state 
A’s unquestionably superior jets in 7 years time? Without a hard law legal remedy 
and a court to appeal to, there is precisely very little guarantee. 
4.2.2 Views from supply side practitioners  
The response from the defence industry, comprising of contractors, national level 
industry associations and export support agencies, was largely similar to that of 
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the policy makers. Muted references to the CoC making the process of defence 
procurement more ‘transparent’ and ‘open’ where again the more favourable 
points made. In particular, praise was given to the fact that the voluntary reporting 
system under which subscribing Member States notified all Article 346 contract 
notices worth over €1 million actually functioned exceptionally well and helped to 
build mutual trust.144 Additionally, in terms of success, some of those interviewed 
noted that the access to the supply chains of prime contractors in other Member 
States had improved. One director of exports at a national industry association in  
a large Member State reported that our “small and medium enterprises have 
actually been quite successful in selling high value sub-components and 
specialised pieces to European prime contractors”
145
 while another respondent 
noted that markets for “sub-systems and prime contractor supply chain are more 
accessible...”146 than for finished systems.  
Despite these few positive comments the prevailing opinion was again one of 
pessimism and respondents concluded that the CoC has had no impact on either 
the overall level of cross-border trade or in reducing the use of Article 346.  
When asked about their success in exporting to other EU Member States and 
whether it had improved over the past five to six years there were no positive 
responses. The Vice President of European Affairs at one prime contractor glumly 
stated “we cannot say we have seen positive results”147. Others noted that their 
strategic orientation for exports was now largely outside the EU as the chances of 
winning contracts in Europe’s protected markets were a waste of resources. 
Several cited the combination of mature, or saturated, markets as well as weak 
budgetary outlook for this re-orientation.148 One respondent from an industry 
association noted that many of his members had somewhat given up on Europe, 
citing past bad experiences where despite supposedly open and welcoming 
tendering procedures the final contract award was seen as a ‘stitch-up’ and that 
and that most had now focused their efforts on extra-EU exports as they are “so to 
speak, lower hanging fruit”149. Another respondent noted that his members look 
outside Europe for their future growth as the lingering over-capacity in Europe 
has led to a “crowded market in which there are many wolves”150 fighting over 
flat demand. 
Regarding the impact on the use of Article 346 respondents were unconvinced 
that the CoC could have had an effect in reducing its use.151 They cited the 
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difficulty of challenging such a contentious issue in general and that it would be 
implausible to curb Member States’ persistent and wide-ranging application of 
Article 346 using a soft law instrument. This view is unsurprising as the CoC 
essentially challenges the prevailing interpretation of the Article 346 which, 
whether right or wrong, is set squarely within the binding hard law of the EU 
treaties. The jury of the legal profession is largely out152 on what value soft law 
has in regulatory application. Some argue it provides a viable way forward when 
Member States wish to collaborate but there is no political will for EU level 
binding legislation153 however, others have noted that it lacks the certainty and 
precision to form a reliable basis for taking legal action154. Under this latter 
interpretation it is highly unlikely that a soft law instrument will change actor 
behaviour as actors in the market will still have no functioning legal remedy to 
challenge any perceived or actual ‘infringements’. 
Regarding the EBB, views were mixed. Some welcomed its conception 
inasmuch as it created a centralised “shopping list for all EU Member States 
ministries of defence”155, while others confirmed that they definitely use it156. 
However, this was not the full picture; one respondent’s company was apparently 
unaware of the EBB’s existence and operates exclusively within Article 346 
exemptions despite their product having a largely commoditized status within the 
European arms market157.  Another was unashamedly dismissive and accused the 
EDA of ‘beating its own drum’ over the EBB while they on the industry side have 
seen no improvement in cross-border orders.158  In the end of the day it matters 
whether the EBB facilitates cross-border contract awards and not whether it was 
simply advertised at the EU level but ultimately handed to a national supplier 
regardless. Considering the pessimistic views presented on cross-border trade and 
persisting Article 346 usage it would be largely implausible if not contradictory to 
consider the EBB a major success as part of the CoC’s soft law regime.  
4.2.3 Views from demand side practitioners   
The most notable difference when speaking to the demand side practitioners was 
the manner in which they answered questions. Whereas the policy makers and 
supply side practitioners were willing to speak candidly and expressed their 
personal opinions about the CoC and any impact it may have had, demand side 
practitioners gave answers that sounded more like a department press releases or 
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lines to take. For example, when asked if their ministry/government had changed 
its approach to defence procurement after the CoC was introduced the answers 
seemed generic and prescribed rather than specific and motivated i.e. “our long 
standing policy is to buy goods, works and services under an open and fair 
procurement process, which maximises the use of competition in order to seek 
best value for money”
159 or “[our ministry]... applies the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement (the Code) to all 
contracts for goods and services above the specified threshold of 1,000,000 Euros 
that meet the criteria for the Article 346 "warlike stores" exemption.” 
160
 As the 
demand side actors in the market are ones who need to change their behaviour and 
are therewith the target of the CoC it is perhaps not surprising that answers did not 
provide a more nuanced interpretation of events. After all, which public servant 
wishes to be the one who outs his own government as a free rider? As soft law 
regimes largely depend on peer pressure to change behaviour161 it would be 
logical for actors to at least state their commitment to the agreed rules rather than 
providing a more complex answer that could show their party to the agreement in 
bad light. 
In terms of assessing how successful the CoC has been statements again 
focussed on the idea that transparency had been increased162, that the EDA’s 
reporting regime for Article 346 exemptions functioned well and may yet prove 
useful in any attempt to monitor and police the market once directive 2009/81/EC 
comes into full force.163 One respondent did claim that the code “opened up 
procurement to cross border competition amongst EDA Member States”
164 but 
suggested the EDA would be better informed on the statistical performance. 
Incidentally they are not, and as witnessed above, are decidedly less optimistic 
about the success of their CoC in increasing cross border trade. 
Examples also arose of how defence procurement still is not conducted on a 
price competitive basis as would be expected in other forms of public 
procurement. It was stated that due to the technical nature of defence procurement 
it often requires non-competitive selection of suppliers.165 For example, when 
supply is urgent or in scenarios where only original equipment manufacturers 
have the necessary expertise needed to upgrade or modify existing systems. 
Interestingly one respondent from a large Member State explained how their 
ministry defined ‘competitive procurement’. It was defined as “securing the best 
mix of effectiveness, efficiency and economy in the use of resources and impact on 
society as a whole over the period of use and disposal of the goods, works or 
services acquired”166. If one want to read into these criteria more specifically the 
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phrase “impact on society as a whole” could be seen as a legitimizing stamp for 
all sorts of uncompetitive procurement choice provided they maintain strategic 
manufacturing jobs or specific technical knowhow within national borders. 
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the demand side interviews provide a 
certain insight in terms of what actions were not taken rather than ones which 
were. When speaking to the head of defence industrial participation from a large 
Member State they noted that their approximately 20 year old defence industrial 
participation policy* was in the process of being updated to bring it in line with 
directive 2009/81/EC.167 This implies that no reform measures were undertaken in 
2005-2006 to bring the policy in line with the CoC. Furthermore, the defence 
procurement specialist, incidentally from the same Member State, stated that they 
have not changed the above quoted procurement criteria in recent years either.168 
Thus it seems that either a) the Member State in question felt its procurement and 
industrial participation programmes were in line with the promises of the CoC or 
b) they didn’t care to change them or their behaviour. Purely speculating, the fact 
that changes are being made for the hard law directive and no changes were made 
for the CoC implies that the latter did not instil the same sense of commitment 
among the target actor. However, as said, purely speculative. 
4.3 Soft law and soft results 
The results of the quantitative study seemed to largely support the hypothesis that 
the EDA’s CoC and corresponding EBB had led to a rise in the cross-border trade 
of conventional weapons among EU Member States. It was expected that Member 
States would open up their procurement budgets to foreign competition and select 
suppliers on a cost competitive basis. However, the results of the qualitative study 
are less conclusive. Although some indications of minor success for SME’s were 
presented, overall there was little commitment to the idea that the CoC had led to 
any observable rise in cross-border trade or reduced the use of Article 346. 
The most problematic obstacle faced by the CoC is unsurprisingly its own soft 
law form. Many respondents noted that in the field of defence procurement it is 
exceedingly problematic to use legal remedies to challenge the outcome of a 
tender due to the structure of this quasi-market.169 As the customer base is 
incredibly narrow, i.e. limited to national governments, there is a strong incentive 
for suppliers not to challenge unjust outcomes. Rather, through obsequious 
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Such an immediate effect is cause for suspicion as the SIPRI data indicates the 
date of delivery not the date of order, suggesting that perhaps other earlier factors 
played a bigger role than the CoC. For reference, when speaking to policy makers 
they expected the impact of 2009/81/EC to be relatively modest and slow as it will 
take time for case law to emerge and have therefore scheduled the first review of 
it for 2016.173 These modest expectations were espoused by supply side 
respondents as well.174 Furthermore, defence procurement is often a protracted 
and cautious process again suggesting that such an immediate impact of the CoC 
in 2006-2007 is very unlikely.  
Interestingly the import statistics for the Eastern Enlargement countries show 
a steady rise leading up to a 2004-2005 peak around the time of their accession 
where after they plateau into a slow decline. This supports the idea that in 
expectation of pending membership the new Member States started to procure 
more intentionally from the EU. Perhaps even more interestingly after falling 
from P1-2 imports to the new Member States from outside the EU (most notably 
from the USA) actually rise by a very substantial 105% between P2 and P3. 
Considering how imports from fellow EU Member States taper off in P3 this 
implies that the new Member States, once having secured membership of the EU 
swiftly re-orientated their procurement preferences across the Atlantic. This could 
very well be a reality as the US has had a strong influence on the new Member 
States who had also recently joined NATO. In fact when speaking to one Western 
European respondent about offsets they noted, somewhat in disapproval, that the 
new Member States had been extremely effective in negotiating hefty civilian FDI 
packages when making offset deals.175 
So what is the most plausible answer as to whether the CoC has led to the 
marketization of the European defence equipment market by way of more 
competitive procurement and increasing cross-border trade? It seems that ‘modest 
impact’ might be the best prognosis for now. Although the respondents were less 
than enthusiastic about the CoC’s impact, they had little hard data to contradict 
what is observed in the statistical part of this study. Thus, it seems that slow 
progress towards open procurement and increasing cross-border trade is 
happening, but not exclusively due to the CoC. Rather it is a contributory factor. 
In the next section other possible explanations will be explored with the aim of 
further clarifying the results of the statistical study.  
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5 In search of causation 
If we propose that CoC had a small impact on the marketization efforts in the 
EDEM, then what other factors were there? This chapter will attempt to find a 
more plausible explanation for what is behind the trends observed in the statistical 
study.  
 
5.1 The unlikely and dismissible 
In this first section the aim is to dismiss some of the other factors that may be 
considered to have had an impact on the statistical trends observed. 
5.1.1 The European Commission’s 2006 Communicative 
Interpretation 
In 2006 the European Commission published an ‘interpretative communication’ in 
which it sought to clarify, from its perspective at least, the continued 
misinterpretation of Article 346.176 According to the Commission, the wide and 
almost default application of the exemption by Member States is at odds with the 
original intentions of the exemption and that many states may be violating Single 
Market rules. However, its explanatory power when considering the rise in intra-
EU trading observed is subject to exactly the same two pitfalls of the CoC; 
namely, it is also a soft law instrument177 and its questionable timing in relation to 
the trends observed.   
As a soft law instrument it would, much like the CoC, not be able to form a 
precise enough legal framework in which companies would feel confident enough 
to challenge unfair procurement decisions. Coupling this with the statements 
made during the interview about the lack of case law on Article 346 application178 
and it is unlikely that the communication managed to change behaviour.  
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In terms of timing, the interpretative communication is even less likely than 
the CoC to be a contributory factor as it was only released in December 2006. 
Remember that the peak trading years witnessed in graph 4 were 2006-2007 and 
that such an immediate impact in a field where the procurement process is 
protracted is not likely. Again the evidence does not suggest the interpretative 
communication played any significant role in explaining the trends observed.  
5.1.2 The financial crisis and budgetary pressure 
Another notion to be entertained, and suggested by some peers, is the idea that the 
financial crisis and consequent recession may have pushed Member States to 
procure in a much more rational and cost effective manner, as opposed to 
continuing support for dilapidated and underperforming national suppliers. While 
this might be the advice given by many a rational economist it is rarely the 
response taken by politicians when confronted with rising unemployment and an 
upcoming election. In fact in general and across the economy as a whole the 
typical knee jerk response in such times of crisis is towards protectionism.179 In 
fact the incentives to pursue protectionist policies in the field of defence 
procurement are especially strong. As EU Member States cannot subvert the rules 
of the Single Market among each other, defence procurement and the Article 346 
exemption is possibly one of the few fields where they can get away with 
protectionist policies. Furthermore, on the EU level defence spending on 
equipment procurement has actually remained remarkably consistent with pre 
crisis levels.180 As Member States can channel such defence spending within their 
own borders it is often seen a credible way to provide a high skilled sector of the 
economy with a counter cyclical stimulus in true Keynesian fashion. Thus, 
ultimately one would expect, if anything, that the financial crisis and recession 
would push states more towards defence protectionism than the opposite. 
5.1.3 Collaboration under OCCAR  
As the only remaining relevant institution in the post 2000 period for facilitating 
collaborative European defence procurement programmes (aside from the EDA) 
the Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d'armement or OCCAR 
may too have played a role in the rise of cross-border trade, even if not through 
competitive procurement. Yet an examination of its major programmes post-2000 
reveals it is unlikely to be responsible for our P3 rise in cross-border trade either. 
For example, despite originally having the UK on board the Boxer armoured 
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personnel carrier programme was soon reduced to a bilateral programme 
involving the Netherlands and Germany. Surprise, surprise full production is 
taking place in both countries.181 Furthermore, aside from some demonstrators, 
deliveries for deployment purposes only started in early 2012 putting it outside the 
timeframe of the data in our statistical study. The A400m airlifter can be excluded 
for the same reasons due to the fact that aside from demonstrator and test units, no 
deliveries have been made as of October 2012182. Regarding the FREMM naval 
vessel programme, again production is divided and completed nationally in the 
two participating Member States.183 Finally, in the case of the Tiger Helicopter 
production is again divided and duplicated across the three participating 
countries184 and deliveries have been across Period 2 and 3185 meaning it too 
would not serve to explain the rise observed after 2006. Thus ultimately OCCAR 
may contribute somewhat to the cross-border trade in conventional weapons 
among its participating states but its projects certainly do not explain the trends 
seen in our statistical study. 
5.1.4 Increased demand from the Iraqi and Afghan wars 
Eight Member States took part in the Iraq war and fully 23, to varying degrees, 
deployed troops with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan. Did the extra demand for equipment caused by these military 
engagements lead to a rise in cross-border procurement? But what would drive 
Member States to change their priorities on where they source such extra 
procurements? Or in other words why would it lead to an increasing tendency to 
shop cross-border. Here the explanation might be that a suitable national supplier 
for unpredictable custom equipment or urgently required items needed for 
deployment cannot be found. Hence Member States must rely on suppliers from 
other Member States. This theory might well explain some of the increases 
observed and a good way to analyse it for example in the Iraq case would be to 
isolate the eight participating nations and compare their imports growth to that 
observed in the remaining group. However, this would also require some scaling 
of the degree to which each Member States was engaged in the war; e.g. the UK 
troop and equipment contribution to Iraq was several times the size of the 
remaining seven participants from the EU. This task is unfortunately outside the 
scope of this paper. Yet what can be done is to look at the overall import statistics 
(EU originating & extra EU originating) of the EU-27 and try to determine if 
imports have risen overall. The results of this inquiry can be seen below in graph 
5.  
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Looking first to the level of total imports:
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These findings do not necessarily challenge the notion that a form of 
marketization is taking place in the EDEM; however, they pose some serious 
questions about the form that very market is taking. It seems that the market being 
built is a closed one and that EU membership is becoming a prerequisite for 
participation in it. This scenario, in which the European arms market becomes an 
ever more impenetrable fortress, was proposed in the Centre for European Reform 
paper as early as 1999187 and the logic driving Europe’s apparent outwardly 
protectionist strategy is not difficult to motivate.  
Europe’s defence trade relationship with the US has long been an asymmetric 
one and has been described as a “one way street”188. The US has had huge success 
in exporting major weapons systems to Europe yet when the opposite is attempted 
there is more than often a closed door.189 This set-up was tolerated during the 
Cold War and seen as a trade off for the US’s European military presence. In 
addition, by virtue of having the world’s largest single defence market coupled 
with significantly higher levels of research and development spending, US 
defence products were consistently more cost competitive and technologically 
advanced than their European counterparts.190 However, this supremacy is not 
longer absolute across the board and in many areas the European DTIB is on par 
and even exceeds its global competitors191. Yet closing the technological and cost 
competitiveness gap has not helped Europe win contracts from the US 
Department of Defence further confirming Washington’s determination not to let 
major defence procurements go abroad.192 The protectionism in US defence 
procurement is unsurprising when looking at the regulatory landscape 
underpinning it. US firms are supported by an explicit “Buy American Act”193 of 
which there is no European equivalent.194 This act necessitates that US suppliers 
be given priority, has a fund to support them when they are uncompetitive and 
even goes as far as to promote only the use of US made machine tools for the 
production of said procurements.195 
In addition to this already stressed relationship the US has been perceived to 
use its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to hamper and even 
sabotage potential competition from European suppliers of systems which 
integrate US made ITAR listed sub-components. Essentially the US can veto the 
export of any EU made system with an ITAR component. The fear of this 
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scenario drove several Member States to abandon plans to arm the Eurofighter 
with an American air-to-air missile despite written reassurances from the Clinton 
administration not to block exports.196 One of the respondents noted that the US 
has even been known to use this strategy to block or delay intra-EU procurements 
in which the direct competitor is a US alternative.197 This has prompted EU 
Member States to collaborate and develop “ITAR FREE” systems to avoid such 
complications.198 It seems that both the huge defence trade deficit and the risk of 
using US made ITAR listed components have pushed Europe towards creating a 
much more closed defence equipment market. Yet, if as claimed by some199, the 
EU has no ‘buy European clause’ then how is such a strategic shift occurring? 
Some clues were provided during the interviews and a closer look at the CoC 
indicates it may have some rather protectionist wording in it which supports our 
observed trends. 
When speaking to the director of international affairs from a defence industry 
association in the US a few significant points were made. Firstly, the progressive 
closing off of the European defence equipment market to external suppliers was 
an experience most definitely experienced by members of the association. 
Secondly, in terms of what was driving this strategic shift the European 
Commission and the EDA were named as the driving forces behind this long term 
trend and more recently the determination to create a pan-European defence 
procurement community with an integrated European DTIB.200 It was also noted 
that although ITAR items do pose problems for European producers, until the 
recent coming into force of the Defence Transfers Directive 2009/43/EC it has 
actually not necessarily been any easier to transfer defence equipment between 
Member States than with extra-EU states.201 This indicates that binding hard law 
of the EU has not until present played a role causing this observed shift towards 
fortress Europa. However, once the new licensing system of the directive comes 
into force this will make intra-EU arms transfers considerable easier than extra-
EU ones suggesting our observed trends will continue along their present 
trajectory. 
Finally, is it possible to link the EDA CoC to these trends after all? Perhaps it 
has not created the open and competitive market desired by some, yet it may have 
had an impact on the creation of Fortress Europa. At first glance the CoC is about 
promoting open and transparent competition in defence procurement. Concerning 
selection criteria during procurement the CoC prescribes that “All companies will 
be evaluated on the basis of transparent and objective standards, such as 
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possession of security clearance, required know-how and previous experience”. 
However, it also stipulates that the CoC is 
 
“...aimed at encouraging application of competition in this segment of Defence 
procurement, on a reciprocal basis between those subscribing to the regime.” 
 
that 
 
“The regime will operate on the basis of sovereign Member States voluntarily 
choosing to align their policies and practices, on a reciprocal basis, in this area.” 
 
and that 
 
“We wish to maximise opportunities for all suppliers based on each others’ 
territories to compete in our competitions.” 
 
 
In light of the above extracts from the CoC it seems that Europe has at least the 
elements of a soft law ‘buy European clause’. This may well have contributed to 
the trends observed, however, whether to classify it as a step towards the 
‘marketization’ of defence procurement in Europe is more difficult. This shift has 
not led to a higher proportion of Member State procurement budgets being spent 
abroad; instead it has come at the expense of extra-EU suppliers being 
progressively excluded from contracts in the EU. 
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6 Conclusions 
Answering the research problem with a high degree of certainty was always going 
to be a challenge. The dynamics at play that may have impacted the level of intra-
EU trade in conventional weapons are wide and determining equifinality of 
causation is therefore a less than straightforward exercise. Nonetheless, both parts 
of this study make unique empirical contributions to knowledge in their own right. 
In terms of answering the research problem it concluded that the EDA’s CoC has 
had at best a very limited impact on the process marketizing defence procurement 
in the European Union. 
6.1.1 Contribution to knowledge 
The statistical part of this study has played a largely confirmatory role. Whereas 
other literature in the field has referred to increasing European collaboration on 
arms projects or suggested that the US is selling less conventional weapons to 
Europe in the post Cold-War period, this paper confirms these trends from 1994-
2011. It has confirmed that the European Union Member States are progressively 
trading more conventional weapons amongst each other. Furthermore, it shows 
that the level of growth in intra-EU trading has been accelerating over time 
suggesting the formation of a European defence procurement community. 
However, the study also confirmed that the overall level imports, or in other 
words the proportion of EU defence procurement budgets spend abroad, have 
remained static across the whole period of the study. The logical consequence of 
these first observations is that extra-EU sales of conventional weapons to Europe 
have been in a steady decline since the end of the Cold War and continue to fall in 
the final period covered in this study.  
The qualitative part of the study has also presented new knowledge collected 
from specialists across the spectrum of the defence procurement establishment. 
Evidence showed that practitioners from the field largely framed the success of 
the CoC in other terms than successful market creation per se. Rather than citing 
cross-border trade or competitive procurement, success was framed much more 
modestly in term of increasing transparency and openness. It also confirmed that, 
as predicted in the legal literature, soft law measures will not have much success 
in creating or regulating markets. Responses displayed that the CoC fell short of 
providing any form of ‘legal remedy’, seen as necessary in market creation. As 
firms have no legal certainty governments face a very slim chance of being 
challenged over acting in a protectionist manner. On top of this, respondents also 
indicated that even with legal certainty the structure of the market with its narrow 
customer base acts as a disincentive for firms to antagonise relations with Member 
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States. Thus all in all the prospect of free-ridership remains high and is more than 
likely rife across the sector, reinforcing the continued hesitance to allow genuinely 
competitive procurement. 
6.1.2 Modest measures, modest impact  
In light of the empirical findings can the EDA’s CoC be convincingly linked to 
the marketization of defence procurement in Europe? In one word: no. Despite the 
statistical study providing a ‘false-positive’ of sorts the overall findings suggest 
that the CoC had little impact on marketization. 
Initially the trends observed in the statistical study showed that there had been 
a marked and noticeable increase in the level of intra-EU trading in conventional 
weapons. This at first suggested that the CoC had had quite a significant impact 
on cross-border trade and had therewith promoted more open, fair and competitive 
procurement. However, once contextualised against the backdrop of the overall 
levels of imports (including extra-EU originating ones) and considering the rather 
cohesive views gathered during the expert interviews, it is clear that movement 
towards marketization has progressed at turtles pace and the likelihood of the CoC 
having had an impact is very slim indeed. 
What appears to be happening is the creation of a European defence 
procurement community in which European Union Member States have become 
progressively more protectionist towards defence imports from outside the union. 
The result has been the redistribution of foreign defence procurement spending 
from outside the Union to inside the Union. At face value these trends do not 
necessarily exclude the notion that a form marketization is occurring. Indeed, 
disgruntled with the one-way nature of the transatlantic defence trade it is not 
inconceivable that the EU Member States are seeking to form an exclusive market 
for defence equipment amongst themselves. This strategy could very plausibly be 
employed to mitigate the threats posed by the preponderate U.S. defence sector 
and give European firms a larger ‘home market’ from which to compete on a 
global scale.  However, even if this strategy is play, it is unlikely that a real cost 
competitive market is being behind the rise observed in Intra-EU transfers. 
Several findings undermine the idea that competitive procurement has led to 
the rise in intra-EU trading. Firstly, the prominent and immediate impact seen 
2006 and 2007 were shown to be too early to be attributed to the CoC. Secondly, 
the expert interviews showed that the CoC did not provide the legal remedies 
necessary for market creation. Thirdly, the supply side practitioners and policy 
makers seemed sceptical that governments had changed their procurement 
behaviour a fact seemingly confirmed by demand side respondents who noted that 
procurement policies were only now being updated in accordance with 
2009/EC/81.  
So what can explain the rises seen in intra-EU trading? One thing which must 
be noted is that the cross-border market for arms in the EU was overall very small. 
Thus, even seemingly large percentage gains need not represent a revolutionary 
change in procurement behaviour. Rather it is proposed that the rises seen can be 
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attributed to increased opening-up in the supply chain across the European 
defence industry as indicated by the respondents. Although this can be seen as a 
form of marketization and merited as a step towards rationalisation, firms were 
not the intended target of the CoC on Defence Procurement, governments were. It 
was intended to open up procurement at the end-user stage and this it did not 
convincingly do. 
Thus it is most plausible that the CoC on Defence Procurement had little or no 
impact on the marketization of defence procurement among the Member States of 
the EU. Its impact is limited to the creation of a reporting system for the use of 
Article 346 and success can be measured in terms of greater transparency and 
openness in the use of the exemption. Yet ultimately it did not lead to a reduction 
in the use of the exemption and therewith also failed to introduce fair and cost 
based competitive procurement. 
 
6.1.3 Future prospects & further research  
The transposition deadlines for both the Defence Procurement Directive 
2009/81/EC and the Defence Transfers Directive 2009/43/EC passed in 2012. 
Pending a few stragglers against who the Commission has started infringement 
proceedings the new hard law regime should soon be in full force.202 Expectations 
are mixed and its success will, as experience has shown, continue to hang on how 
Member States and the Court of Justice choose to interpret Article 346.203 One 
respondent whose company lobbied hard for 2009/81/EC noted that it became 
known colloquially as the “Swiss-cheese” directive as it was riddled with so many 
loopholes and exemptions.204 Although some of the initial loopholes have been 
closed, several respondents remained unconvinced that the directive would change 
the status quo significantly.205 However, there are a few positive elements which 
should help open procurement. The procurement directive defines more 
concretely what constitutes an abuse of Article 346 and importantly, specifies that 
whole programmes can no longer be exempted. Rather each individual part of a 
programme must be merited an exemption in its own right.206 As for the defence 
transfers directive, it will for the first time standardise the intra-EU transfer of 
arms making it significantly less bureaucratic and costly for European firms to 
collaborate and for Member States to procure cross-border.207 The expected 
impact here will be the continuation of the trend to towards an ‘exclusive’ 
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European defence procurement community. Interestingly the single respondent 
from the U.S. noted that transfer’s directive has finally kicked Washington into 
action over reforming the ITAR system.208 This was seen as necessary to ensure 
collaboration with and procurement from the U.S. does not become, relatively, 
even more unattractive for Member States due to the pending easing of intra-EU 
transfers. 
Several avenues could be pursued to further the knowledge in this field. Most 
notably this study took a rather simplistic view, treating defence procurement in 
Europe as a cohesive whole. It would be interesting to embark on a more detailed 
country by country analysis in order to determine if some Member States are 
opening defence procurement more while others appear to free-ride. Another 
exercise might be to try and verify the accuracy of the SIPRI data utilized in this 
study. Indeed its values cannot be compared directly with Member States exact 
transfer values. However, one could take official statistics from a handful of states 
where they are available and compare the percentage change in imports from 
other EU members across the same periods in this study. If the SIPRI figures are 
somewhat representative of reality the percentage change in transfers across the 
periods should be fairly similar. Finally, under the new hard law regime it is 
hoped that uniform official statistics on the defence sector at the EU level become 
more readily available making future studies in the field both more reliable and a 
great deal more straightforward.  
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7 Executive Summary  
Research problem and aim 
 
Defence and security materials have been exempted from the European Union’s 
Single Market leaving Europe with a highly fragmented defence technological and 
industrial base. Dating back to the Treaty of Rome the present day Article 346 
TEU ensures Member States can bypass Single Market rules on defence and 
security materials which are considered to be ‘essential’ to their security interests. 
Rather than functioning as a targeted, specific and seldom used exemption for 
high tech items such as nuclear or cryptographic technologies, Member States 
have interpreted and applied Article 346 more or less to all defence procurement 
be it essential to security or not. 
While this approach was somewhat sustainable under Cold War defence 
expenditure patterns it has become increasingly untenable as the 1990’s ushered 
in the so called ‘peace dividend’ that saw European defence budgets slashed by 
more than half. Tighter budgets and smaller production runs have made it an 
increasing challenge for Member States to sustain individual national weapons 
programmes. This is compounded by the fact that the cost of high-end weapons 
systems is rising at a pace significantly faster than inflation. Several Member 
States have tried to export their way out of this conundrum. The idea here has 
been to achieve longer production runs and hence gain economies of scale, 
thereby lowering the per-unit cost for the Member State who developed it. While 
this strategy has not been wholly unsuccessful it must contend with one crucial 
and problematic fact. In the mid 1990’s the United States drastically rationalised 
their defence sector to form a handful of global defence behemoths. With internal 
demand in excess of the entire compiled EU demand, many US programmes have 
already achieved long production runs and lower unit costs well before their 
products arrive on the international market making them very price competitive. 
Another approach to counteract the issue of limited and fragmented demand in 
Europe has been to embark on collaborative procurement programmes. While 
these programmes have produced some convincing products in terms of ability 
and technological advancement, they have failed to bring the desired economic 
benefits of pooled resources. Such collaboration has been conducted on the 
principle of juste retour under which each participating Member State receives a 
share of R&D and production contracts in terms of both value and man hours 
relative to their share of investment. This leads to sub-optimal selection of 
suppliers and experience has shown that in most cases the entire final production 
lines are multiplied across the participating Member States, significant reducing 
the desired economic gains. Additionally this set up has arguably done more to 
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sustain ailing national suppliers than allow the wholesale reduction in capacity 
needed by way of increased mergers & acquisitions. 
After several decades of this collaborative arms procurement conducted on 
juste retour principles the Member States of the European Union are finally 
moving towards market based solutions in their attempts to maintain a 
competitive and sustainable defence technological and industrial base on the 
continent. In the early 2000’s while still unprepared to allow the Commission to 
lead a supranationalisation of the defence sector Member States opted for an 
intergovernmental solution under the aegis of the European Defence Agency. This 
paper seeks to conduct a baseline study on the impact of the European Defence 
Agency’s 2005/6 Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement (CoC), the first 
explicitly market based measures taken to confront the challenges facing the 
defence industry across the continent. The research question to be answered is: 
 
Has the EDA’s CoC been successful in promoting the marketization of defence 
procurement in the European Union?  
 
 
Methodology 
 
The research design employs mixed methods in the following manner: A) a 
preliminary statistical study into the volume of intra-European trade in 
conventional weapons from 1994-2011 (cross-border trade is treated as a proxy 
for the occurrence marketization), and B) a series of semi-structured interviews 
with policy makers, as well as policy practitioners from both the supply and 
demand side of the defence procurement equation.  
The objective of the preliminary statistical study is to establish what trends 
the trade in conventional weapons in Europe have been taking. The eighteen year 
period is broken down into three six year periods. Thus the six years since the 
Code of Conduct came into force will be compared with the six years previous to 
highlight any changes in trading levels. The earliest six year period will act as a 
control to determine if changes witnessed pre and post CoC can be separated from 
the general trajectory of trends across the entire timescale of the study. As the 
CoC is not the only action taken to address the issue of persistent Article 346 use 
the objective of the expert interviews was to attribute causation to any changes 
seen in the trade trends from the statistical study. 
 
Empirical data 
 
For the statistical study a self compiled dataset was generated using the Trade 
Indicator Value (TIV) tables sourced from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI). Once collated and transformed this dataset functioned 
as a powerful and unique source for trade level trend observation at a macro level. 
The qualitative part of the study involved 11 expert interviews conducted with 
respondents from across five countries. Interviewees were initially questioned on 
how the perceived the CoC and what motivations they would give for its 
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success/failure in marketizing the defence procurement process in Europe. 
Thereafter, other measures in the legislative and legal landscape were explored for 
their potential explanatory power in relation to the observed trends. 
 
Findings 
 
Results indicate that at best the measures have had a small impact on 
marketization. Although the initial results of the preliminary statistical study are 
decisive, equifinality in causation is ultimately difficult to attribute to the Code of 
Conduct as many complex dynamics ultimately affect the trends observed.  
The statistical study displays very clearly that post 2006 the level of intra 
European trade in conventional weapons accelerates at an unprecedented rate 
implying there has been some shift in policy or actions that caused it. However, 
the link between the CoC and this rise appeared to be weak once the evidence 
from the expert interviews was considered. This prompted a wider analysis of EU 
Member State imports to include imports from 3rd party countries. Once 
considered in this wider context it is clear that Member States have not per se 
increased imports, rather they appear to be pursuing a ‘buy European’ policy at 
the expense of imports from outside the Union. Furthermore, respondents 
indicated that the supply chains of European defence firms have seen considerable 
opening up to cross border procurement at the sub-systems level. Although, both 
these trends can be seen as a modest success, the CoC has seemingly not managed 
to change behaviour at the end-user stage of procurement i.e. it was aimed to 
make governments procure on a market orientated cost-competitive basis and this 
was not convincingly achieved. That said, it is possible to talk of the progressive 
forming of an ‘exclusive’ European defence procurement community. 
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